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events. In Stanford v. Roche8, a 2011 Supreme 
Court case addressing the question of whether 
universities or individual academic scientists 
should have default ownership under Bayh-
Dole, the US government invoked as an argu-
ment in favor of default university ownership 
the claim that such ownership would more 
readily promote accountability than owner-
ship by individual scientists9. A 2010 National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on Bayh-
Dole has several chapters and recommenda-
tions that specifically target accountability10.
Most recently, in the 2011 America Invents 
Act, universities secured a privileged position 
for their patents. Unlike all other infringe-
ment defendants, defendants charged with 
infringement of patents that originated in a 
university will not be able to assert a newly 
enacted defense of “prior use”11. Thus, even 
in cases where a defendant has successfully 
commercialized without even being aware of 
a subsequently issued patent originating in a 
university, the defendant could be found guilty 
of infringement. The privileged position uni-
versities and their assignees and/or licensees 
now hold in patent litigation, even against 
prior, independent commercializers, makes 
proper information as to whether those patents 
rather than promote it can arise when univer-
sities or their licensees and/or assignees assert 
these patents against independent commer-
cializers3,4. They can also arise when universi-
ties license or assign federally funded patents 
to firms that aggregate these patents in mass 
quantities for purposes of assertion against 
firms that produce products5. Indeed, in the 
latter case, proper reporting regarding utiliza-
tion may be the only mechanism by which the 
government knows how a federally funded pat-
ent was deployed. Universities are reluctant to 
publicize their dealings with aggregators6, and 
aggregators typically do not record exclusive 
licenses with the US Patent and Trademark 
Office. Even assignments may not be recorded, 
or are recorded using names of shell companies 
that are nontransparent5, with the consequence 
that assignment data can obscure rather than 
clarify questions of utilization.
Proper reporting could also reduce tax-
payer costs associated with procurement. As 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
has pointed out7, the government has a right 
under Bayh-Dole to royalty-free practice of 
patents on federally funded inventions. The 
importance of Bayh-Dole’s accountability pro-
visions has been highlighted by several recent 
The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act established a uni-form, government-wide policy in favor 
of allowing academic recipients of federal 
research funding the right to seek patents on 
inventions arising from that funding. Although 
federal funding obviates the usual “incentive 
to invent” justification for patents, Bayh-Dole’s 
sponsors believed that giving patent owner-
ship to grantees would be the most effective 
mechanism for further developing university 
discoveries into the new products and indus-
tries necessary for maintaining national com-
petitiveness1.
Bayh-Dole does not, however, confer 
entirely unfettered discretion upon grantees. 
To the contrary, the Act contains account-
ability safeguards, including requirements for 
reporting not simply the existence of federally 
funded patents but also information regarding 
the licensing, assignment and practical utiliza-
tion of these patents. The Act also provides the 
government with an array of retained rights in 
the work that it funds2.
At least in theory, these accountability 
safeguards are a significant policy tool. To 
the extent that reporting is implemented 
faithfully, it creates a data set that could be 
extremely useful for evaluating the impact of 
government funding and for calibrating how 
funding should be deployed in the future. 
Proper reporting also assists the government 
in determining whether it should exercise 
its retained rights. These include the right to 
compel additional licensing in cases where the 
grantee or its licensee and/or assignee has not 
achieved “practical application” of an inven-
tion3. Concerns that federally funded academic 
patents are being used to hinder development 
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Figure 1  Percentage of academic biomedical patents with government-interest statements
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researchers are, however, denied any direct 
access to the iEdison database. GAO has occa-
sionally investigated completeness of report-
ing to iEdison, but the last study containing 
actual data was conducted in 1999 (ref. 11). A 
follow-up report issued in 2003 (ref. 7) sim-
ply examined whether the agencies studied in 
1999 had made procedural efforts to improve 
compliance. The 2003 study did not determine 
whether compliance had in fact improved.
The lack of recent empirical data is particu-
larly worrisome because the 1999 GAO report 
found that, out of a sample of 633 medically 
related patents issued to 12 academic grantees, 
143 had most likely arisen from US National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) funding but had nei-
ther been reported to iEdison nor contained 
government-interest statements.
Academic biomedical patents
In our research, we also focused on academic 
biomedical patents. Using a definition of “aca-
demic” developed by one of us in prior work17, 
we obtained information on all academic pat-
ents issued from 1980 to 2007. About 40% of 
all academic patents issued during this period 
mapped to six biomedical patent classes (435, 
514, 424, 530, 536 and 600).
Overall, 43% of these patents had gov-
ernment-interest statements. This share has 
shifted substantially over time, rising from 
30% to 40% in the early 1980s before reaching 
a nadir of 28% around 1991 (Fig. 1). Since 
1991, the percentage has gone up steadily, 
reaching 53% in 2006. By contrast, the federal 
share of total biomedical funding decreased 
somewhat in both the early 1980s and the 
mid to late 1990s (Fig. 2). Thus, reporting 
trends are unlikely to reflect changes in the 
composition of research funding. Moreover, 
because about 60% of academic biomedical 
research was federally funded in the period 
between 1980 and 2007 (Fig. 2), the over-
all 43% incidence of government-interest 
statements provides prima facie evidence of 
underdisclosure.
To provide another perspective on the 
reporting question, we looked at correspon-
dence over time between reporting of patents 
to the NIH and statements of government 
interest in the patent document itself. As 
noted, nongovernment researchers do not 
have direct access to iEdison. However, the 
NIH RePORTER database, unveiled in 2010 
to provide information on NIH grants in 
general, imports data on patents reported to 
NIH from iEdison and thus provides a small 
window into that otherwise secret database. 
The RePORTER website appropriately cau-
tions that “[n]ot all recipients are compliant 
with the iEdison reporting requirements”16. 
Bayh-Dole have held that failure to report 
inventions to the funding agency allows the 
agency to assert title over the patent13.
Additionally, as the legislative history of the 
Bayh-Dole Act emphasizes1, some of the Act’s 
reporting requirements create an opportunity 
for third parties to supplement the oversight 
efforts of resource-strapped funding agen-
cies. For example, Section 202(c) requires not 
only reporting to funding agencies but also a 
statement in the public patent document itself 
regarding the existence of federal funding and 
the fact that the government retains certain 
rights because of this funding. This “govern-
ment interest” statement alerts third parties 
negatively affected by improper use of a patent 
of their ability to petition the funding agency 
to exercise these retained rights1. Specifically, 
based on third-party complaints regarding a 
grantee’s inability to “achieve practical appli-
cation” of an invention or to use the invention 
“to alleviate health and safety needs,” an agency 
may choose to require additional licensing by a 
grantee or its licensee14.
Although funding agencies have, thus far, 
refrained from actually exercising this retained 
right, it has provided important leverage in 
fostering voluntary moves towards more 
commercialization-friendly licensing by uni-
versities, including in such important cases as 
the foundational stem cell patents held by the 
University of Wisconsin15. Moreover, to the 
extent reporting is incomplete, better report-
ing might well foster greater awareness of the 
need to exercise retained rights.
Prior research regarding compliance  
with reporting
As noted, recent empirical data on compli-
ance with reporting requirements are sparse. 
Relevant information on reporting to agencies 
resides in Interagency Edison (iEdison), which 
incorporates information by grantees provided 
to the 29 funding agencies16. Nongovernmental 
involved federal funding even more impor-
tant. If universities and their licensees and/or 
assignees were to assert patents governed by 
Bayh-Dole’s commercialization imperative 
against prior users, universities would directly 
contravene the goals of Bayh-Dole.
Unfortunately, as the 2010 NAS report notes, 
much of the actual data on compliance with 
reporting are incomplete and quite stale. The 
last quantitative study on compliance dates 
back to the 1990s12. This prior research, largely 
conducted by the GAO, also does not attempt 
to determine trends over time. Here we pres-
ent fresh data, quantitative and qualitative, on 
academic biomedical patents, focusing on the 
period from 1980 to 2007. These data suggest 
underreporting throughout the period, albeit 
with some improvement over time.
However, because of the nearly complete 
secrecy associated with relevant government 
databases, our research can shed light only 
on one aspect of the accountability puzzle—
whether the existence of patents was properly 
reported. We cannot investigate completeness 
of reporting regarding licensing and/or assign-
ment and utilization. This level of secrecy is 
unnecessary and counterproductive. We argue 
that, through modest tweaks in relevant Bayh-
Dole regulations, the government could foster 
much greater transparency and accountability, 
including on the fundamental question of how 
the current Bayh-Dole regime is fostering—or 
failing to foster—innovation and competitive-
ness.
Bayh-Dole’s accountability provisions
Under Section 202(c) of Bayh-Dole, a grantee 
must report to the US agency from which 
it received funding any patent application 
the grantee files. The section also allows 
agencies to require “periodic reporting” on 
utilization or efforts at achieving utiliza-
tion. Most agencies require such report-
ing. Subsequent judicial cases interpreting 
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Figure 2  Percentage of academic life sciences research federally funded by year. Calculations based on 
data from NSF WebCASPAR database.
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few of the inventors appear to have been sup-
ported by federal grants covering similar ter-
ritory during the time of the relevant research, 
we deemed the situation “unclear.” We also 
deemed “unclear” situations where the feder-
ally funded research appeared to cover com-
pounds closely related to the patented drug, 
but we could not resolve the precise question 
of overlap. Based on this lack of clarity, we 
excluded five drugs and five associated patents. 
Even with these exclusions, we determined that 
15 patents (and 8 associated drugs) raised sub-
stantial questions about appropriate reporting.
Discussion
Overall, the data suggest that universities are 
improving their compliance with reporting 
obligations. That said, reporting is incomplete 
and could be improved further. Reporting is 
incomplete even for inventions such as FDA-
approved drugs that presumably should be 
high on the radar screen of university tech-
nology transfer offices. Moreover, the fact 
that reporting regarding the mere existence of 
patents is incomplete does not bode well for 
reporting on actual utilization.
Although the burden of accurate report-
ing should be relatively small, incomplete 
reporting has many important consequences. 
Where no patent information whatsoever 
is reported, the consequence is uncertainty 
about the federal government’s “march in” 
rights and understatement of the public sector 
role in innovation. In cases where patents are 
reported, but reporting on utilization is incom-
plete, university success in achieving commer-
cialization of federally funded research cannot 
be assessed comprehensively.
Notably, the lack of transparency sur-
rounding iEdison makes assessment of com-
pliance difficult. Lack of transparency is 
especially acute outside the biomedical field— 
in biomedicine, the NIH RePORTER database 
has at least made indirect access to a small por-
tion of iEdison available. Greater transparency 
would not only facilitate better assessment of 
compliance but would itself improve compli-
ance. Universities that knew compliance was 
going to be monitored, not only by funding 
agencies but also by third-party firms, academ-
ics and public-interest groups would presum-
ably be motivated to improve compliance.
More fundamentally, and across all fields, 
lack of transparency makes systematic analy-
sis of Bayh-Dole’s overall success difficult. 
Although reports on utilization of patented 
inventions are contemplated by Bayh-Dole, and 
are required by many agencies, third parties 
do not have access to information regarding 
report completeness or to underlying specific 
information, presumably contained at least in 
patents. In addition to these drugs (where none 
of the patents acknowledged government sup-
port), seven other drugs were associated with 
some academic patents that acknowledged 
government support, but others that did not.
Following up on this initial finding, we 
determined that a total of 43 patents without 
government-interest statements were associ-
ated with the 28 drugs. Consistent with the lack 
of full correspondence between RePORTER 
and government-interest statements noted 
above, 7 of the 43 patents were listed in the 
NIH RePORTER database. The remaining 
36 patents (associated with 22 drugs) did not 
acknowledge government funding in any way.
Should the 36 patents have been reported? 
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, an invention is a 
“subject invention” governed by reporting obli-
gations and retained government rights if it was 
“conceived of or first actually reduced to prac-
tice in the performance of work under a fund-
ing agreement”19. In practice, as many decades 
of expensive patent litigation over “conception” 
and “reduction to practice” has shown, these 
legal terms of art are hardly a model of clar-
ity. In the case of Bayh-Dole, moreover, one 
has to determine whether conception or first 
reduction to practice occurred while the sci-
entist was performing work under the funding 
agreement.
These caveats aside, one can examine the 
extent to which inventors on the 36 patents 
at issue were receiving federal grants cover-
ing the same inventive territory as the pat-
ent before the patent application was filed. In 
some cases, one can also link publications to 
grants and thereby further rely on the rela-
tionship between information disclosed in 
the publication and the patent document. 
For our qualitative study, we used all publicly 
available scientific information contained in 
inventors’ grants and publications at relevant 
times.
For our analysis, we used a conservative 
definition of “subject invention.” For example, 
when a patent had many inventors and only a 
Even so, the RePORTER data can be used to 
determine if institutions that reported patents 
to iEdison also complied with the Bayh-Dole 
requirement that the public patent document 
itself acknowledge that the invention had 
emerged from federal funding. Simply put, all 
patents disclosed in RePORTER should have 
a government-interest statement in the patent 
document itself.
Figure 3 shows that the share of RePORTER 
patents that have a government-interest state-
ment has generally increased over time, with 
the inflection point coming in 1990, at about 
the same time that the overall percentage of 
government-interest statements in academic 
biomedical patents began to increase. However, 
the incidence of government-interest state-
ments has generally hovered between 60% 
and 80% (Fig. 3). For RePORTER patents, the 
incidence of government-interest statements 
should always be 100%. Even as of 2007, the 
incidence rate was less than 90%.
FDA-approved drugs
We also examined these reporting issues qual-
itatively for patents on FDA-approved small-
molecule drugs. Biomedical therapeutics like 
drugs are directly important for healthcare, 
including healthcare purchased by the US 
government7, and thus are particularly likely 
to raise concerns about lack of accountability. 
A prior study by one of us18 contains a prima 
facie suggestion of noncompliance with report-
ing obligations. That study aimed to assess the 
role of the public sector in the development 
of drugs approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) between 1988 and 2005. 
It did so by examining government-interest 
statements in the patents on those drugs. 
However, to examine the robustness of results 
to alternate indicators of government influ-
ence, the study also examined all drugs where 
academic institutions held patents. Comparing 
the two measures, of the 48 drugs with aca-
demic patents identified in that study, 21 (44%) 
had no government-interest statement in their 
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Figure 3  Percentage of RePORteR patents with government-interest statements.
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pass trade secrets traceable to a specific entity 
or individual, such disclosure was permis-
sible. The Commerce Department could work 
with funding agencies to devise mechanisms 
for information release consistent with the 
Chrysler v. Brown standard, particularly in 
cases where the passage of time has diminished 
the trade secret value of relevant information.
An advantage of the accountability safe-
guards embedded in Bayh-Dole is that they 
should produce a wealth of data. But these 
data are currently shrouded in secrecy, so their 
robustness cannot be assessed, and policy les-
sons cannot be drawn from them. Although 
our research sheds some light, federal agencies 
could, within the limits imposed by law and 
sound policy, shed much more.
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reports that are complete, about exactly who 
universities are transacting with and whether 
university intellectual property management 
has facilitated commercialization. Such lack 
of access is unfortunate, as third parties could 
substantially supplement the analytic efforts of 
government researchers.
The Bayh-Dole Act does not require this 
level of secrecy. To the contrary, the require-
ments regarding government-interest state-
ments in public patent documents and 
march-in contemplate active participation by 
third parties. The Act does contain a provision 
stating that utilization information provided 
by grantees “shall be treated” by the federal 
funding agency as exempt from mandatory 
disclosure under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA)20. The Commerce Department, 
which administers Bayh-Dole, currently reads 
this statutory language as requiring the agency 
to refrain from disclosing “such information to 
persons outside the government without per-
mission of the contractor”21.
Contrary to the Commerce Department 
interpretation, however, the Supreme Court 
has clearly held that agencies have discretion 
to disclose information that Congress has 
exempted from mandatory disclosure under 
FOIA. Specifically, in Chrysler v. Brown22, the 
Court determined that so long as informa-
tion disclosed by an agency did not encom-
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